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1 Requested [] to ascertain from ONE and OGI their respective evaluations of the [] able covering his interview with Mossadeq and the latter's threat to deal with the Russians. 15 January, 16

2 Discussed with [] of OGI his proposed visit to Dr. Kent of ONE in order to offer assistance in the beginning stages of the estimating processes. I later discussed this subject with Dr. Kent and with []. In all of these discussions I made it plain that I felt it would be a great step forward for ONE to have additional assistance from OGI. Dr. Kent again raised a question as to whether OSI would give proper attention to NIEs. I indicated agreement with his position, which was that OGI should take account of the conclusions reached in NIEs and SEs, even though, upon occasion, he recognized that the OGI material might contain evidence inconsistent with such conclusions or might be supplemental thereto. I took this occasion to repeat the Director's statement that he recognized a distinct difference between the considered and coordinated estimates of ONE and the type of flash comment which it was necessary for OGI to make. I also brought [] to date on these discussions and the present understanding is that after Kent and [] have had a talk, Kent will talk with [] and his people. 16 January, 8

3 Later in the day I discussed both with the Director and with Sherman Kent (at separate meetings) the desirability of having both an annual plan for national estimates and an annual plan for IAC research. Under the aegis of IAC such a plan would not put upon CIA the onus of directing research on the part of the respective agencies, but it would afford a means of requiring each of the various agencies to assign a portion of their research strength to the presently neglected job of doing the research that is required to provide an adequate basis for national estimates. I suggested to the Director that the estimate relating to the SAC plan afforded an excellent test case to try out such an operation and he approved making the try. Both Dr. Kent and Dr. Millikan (with whom I later spoke on the same subject) were in hearty approval of the idea of an IRC, operating under IAC auspices. It will be necessary to assign to some individual the job of organizing such an operation. The man chosen should be comparable in qualifications and capabilities with Bill Morell of O/RR, who shepherded the preparation for the British conference. 4 March, 7

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4 Mr. [] informed me that O/GI was preparing an intelligence memorandum containing a round-up of the situation in South America and I undertook to mention to Sherman Kent the desirability of having such memoranda as a quick round-up, even though National Estimates would be prepared on the area some time in the future. Inasmuch as these IMs were being cleared with O/NE, and the procedure was operating very satisfactorily, I felt that there was little likelihood of conflict. 22 April, 8

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5 Attended NSC Senior Staff Meeting which, in part, discussed the ONE estimates program. In connection with this discussion, Mr. Lay raised the question of whether the program for the latter part of this year took account of the necessity for the preparation of FY '54 programs under the NSC 114 series, beginning in September. We indicated that we would review the adequacy of NIE's 64 and 65 for this purpose and would also insure that drafts of these NIE's, as prepared, went directly to the agencies which would soon begin advance preparations on this programming. Admiral Wooldridge also inquired as to the desirability of an estimate covering [] and the [] as well as France and Italy. Dr. Kent explained the difficulties that had been encountered in preparing such an estimate previously, but indicated that the [] position would be covered in the planned survey of the strength of Western Europe, and this seemed to satisfy Admiral Wooldridge. 29 April, 11

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6 Also discussed with Mr. [] the job of coordinating intelligence memoranda as between O/NE and O/CI and assured him that I would take no action on [] memorandum before he had a chance to express fully all of his views. 24 July, 9

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7 Reported to the Director that the O/NE crash estimate was in the President's book. He indicated that O/NE was, perhaps, too preoccupied with getting out coordinated estimates and was not sufficiently alert in preparing this type of crash estimate on fast-moving studies. Later I spoke with [] and also with [] as to how we could work out a joint arrangement for this type of paper. In my mind such a paper has a definite current intelligence aspect, since it should contain a brief current review of the situation to date. It also is an estimate, since it should forecast, at least on a short-range basis, the nature of coming events. The suggestion which appealed most to me was that the original paper be drafted, with due regard for existing tasks and priorities, by either O/CI or O/NE staff and that the final paper be approved by the Board of National Estimates augmented by AD/CI and appropriate representatives from O/CI's publication board. This procedure would be applied exclusively to memoranda for the Director, intended for transmittal to the White House. All parties indicated that they would study the question further and come up with some definite recommendations. 25 July, 4

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8 Made arrangements with Messrs. [] and Kent for O/NE-O/CI collaboration in preparation of the Director's briefing book for next Tuesday. 8 August, 6

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9 Mr. Dulles commented on []'s suggestion of panels on various areas, representing the views of O/CI, O/NE, and the Operational Offices. I explained that we were accomplishing this at present on such areas as Iran, for example, but I would very much prefer to have such questions referred to me so that I would have the opportunity to organize an ad hoc group competent for the particular problem under consideration. In view of the range and complexity of the problems which arose, it would be impossible to form workable panels competent to handle all such questions. I emphasized the efforts that we are making to draw the operational people and the intelligence they possess into the stream of the evaluating processes. 21 August, 3

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